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If someone can confirm what I believe...
A key pair created last decade was 1024 bit. I created a subkey recently of 4096 bit. However the pub key is still 1024 bit. Do I need to export my 4096 bit subkey, and use gpg2 --key-gen with 4096 bits, then import the subkey to be secure (yes/no)?
I don't like littering the Internet with gpg keys, but I am thinking that is my only option to be more secure.
Thanks
partial output:
gpg --edit-key 12345678
pub 1024D/12345678 usage: SCA
sub 1024g/ABCDEDFG revoked usage: E
sub 4096R/1A2B3C4D usage: E
From public key server:
pub 1024D/12345678
sig sig3 12345678
sub 1024g/ABCDEDFG
sig sbind 12345678
sig revok 12345678
However, realistically, this is rather a "theoretical" vulnerability. Unless you are trying to defend against a government or a very determined attacker, 1024 bits are probably fine. Of more concern should be the overall infrastructure of key-management: how are the private keys being secured? Who's in the position to steal a key, and how likely is it that she might do so, and how likely is it that she might get caught? How is the issuing (and periodic replacement) of public keys being taken care of? What is the sensitivity of the data that is being secured, and how and where is that data being transmitted?
Someone who seriously wants to get their hands on a key is probably not going to "break" it. Instead, they'll probably just either try to steal the thing, or, ugh, to break you.
Last edited by sundialsvcs; 06-11-2015 at 09:03 AM.
Someone who seriously wants to get their hands on a key is probably not going to "break" it. Instead, they'll probably just either try to steal the thing, or, ugh, to break you.
Agreed, personally I think SSL solutions are needed, but over rated and misunderstood. In most instances, SSL only encrypts data between two endpoints so that they can not be sniffed on the network. Most applications using SSL are storing the data decrypted. It is easier for a real hacker to break into a system than to break the SSL itself.
There are actually two separate keys one for encryption/decryption and one for signing as well. If you use the same one for both, the key will become vulnerable to attack.
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