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Once they make a standard for one of the algorithms being considered for post quantum cryptography, will we be able to use the same clients like kleopatra, SSH, etc. to use like a lattice key instead of RSA?
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First, post-quantum algorithms have to be standardized by bodies such as the NIST or the IRTF Crypto Forum Research Group. That alone may take a while.
Then, for each application the corresponding IETF standards need to be updated to allow the use of whatever PQC algorithms are available. In the case of OpenPGP for example, the working group
is already aware of that, but there’s nothing much they can do for now until the first step has been completed.
Then, it will be up to the developers to actually implement the thing.
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For example, Verizon still relied on standard mechanisms in its trial to deliver quantum-proof keys to the VPN end-points. This might be a sticking point, if it turns out that this phase of the process is not invulnerable to quantum attack.
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Why does he/she care if the key is securely transmitted if it is just a public key?
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From what I understand, for the purpose of this test they generated all the keys for both sides at a single site, then sent one of the key pairs to the distant site. This is an artificial situation – I am not sure why they did it that way, and the article is poor on details ; maybe the distant site somehow lacked the capability of generating the keys? – in normal usage, both sides would generate a key pair independently.
Of course the problem of
authenticating the public key of the peer – to be sure that you’re talking to who you think you are talking to – remains. As far as I know, this is nowhere near solved by post-quantum cryptography (which is
not the silver bullet that some people sometimes believe it is). Likewise, PQC will also
not solve the problem known as "Adi Shamir’s Law", which states that "cryptography is bypassed, not penetrated".
