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As you all know, it is able to do everything in a system from root account. But if on that server are working 12 VIP users with secret documents - root can become a spy and steal every document :-O. For enemies it is cheaper to make a spy root, than that 12 users. What do you think about that security thing? Root can watch all your documents :-O
Well, IMHO if you don't trust your administrator, you can always hire a new one. Or encrypt your documents, preferribly with some good algorythm and a strong key. And don't store the key together with your documents :]
If you don't trust your root, you can use one of the mandatory access control (MAC) security systems (like SELinux), with policies that limit the access root has to user files.
Well i still think that system admin should only be a person that can be trusted. And if you try to limit his actions, he might feel uncomfortable and start doing funny things around, like trying to bypass your MAC or even turn to the dark side. If you can work on your own local machine, you can just upload the documents for storage and encrypt/decrypt them on a local machine...
But it's more of a theorical question then a practical one. What kind of person might want a bad record on his job-book ( or how's that thing called in english... ).
Then take the largest gun you have and shoot that #&$!@(# straight between the eyes
I think it all leads to a conlusion that you shouldn't employ an admin you don't trust. Ask around, find out as much about him and maybe even ask for psychologist help to determine his commitment to your organisation.
AFAIK, modern spy cannot be determined easily with usual people's methods.
And may be, they will offer money to current admin. But it is practics, And the questions is theory...
well i don't know about the most modern methods ( memory scanning? , but for e.g. when they recruit someone for a high security military/government service they dig really really deep into his/her past. And to their family past too. I think it's common in both our countries
If someone has root (and really, they don't need root) on your box and they want your data, they *will* eventually get it. If they have physical access to the server, it'll be sooner than later. End of story.
I'm pretty sure a corporate fileserver would (should) be in the list of "trusted" machines from a policy standpoint... It (or the person that built it) isn't serving it's purpose very well if it's not.
Which leads up back to "If you can't trust root, you're basically screwed."
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