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Old 05-06-2011, 04:10 PM   #31
Noway2
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Quote:
Lots of these lines: May 5 06:36:15 mmn001 kernel: [166954.174693] ssh-scan[16867]: segfault at 0 ip 8048e33 sp ffe223b0 error 4 in ssh-scan[8048000+c0000]
Now that is suspicious. Do you per chance have other segfault errors, especially and / or anything concerning PHP-CGI? I am guessing that this application is either the scanner or was the entry vector using the segfault to give them a root shell (hint - google the terms ssh scan segfault and you will get some interesting results).

I am not certain what to recommend about putting anything back on line. It is a risk. If you absolutely must, I would say do so by opening specific ports in the firewall, but you will need to concretely verify the integrity of the files in question as well as the server process that you would run. I would also caution to make an image of the system first, with the image you can always perform an analysis at your leisure.
 
Old 05-06-2011, 04:11 PM   #32
OlRoy
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find / -name *ssh-scan*

Should find the scanner and thus the attacker's working directory, unless a type of rootkit has been installed.

You might also want to try:

ls -alh /usr/games/go
ls -alh /tmp/

The garbage isn't base64 and doesn't look like any kind of rot based on frequency of characters. Not that I'm a cryptanalyst or anything. I did some googling and apparently it has to do with the terminal. http://docs.intersystems.com/cache20...Y=GVTT_termdef

Last edited by OlRoy; 05-06-2011 at 04:12 PM.
 
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Old 05-06-2011, 04:15 PM   #33
Hangdog42
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The other bit I'd add to Noway2's observation is that the screen session path is pointing to /usr/games/go (I see OlRoy noticed that one too). That might not be anything, but it strikes me as a bit on the odd side. Might want to have a look in there and see if anything looks suspicious.

Just a couple of comments on your log discoveries:

Apache error log - It's clear someone took/is taking a good hard look at your server for known vulnerabilities. Given the number of pre-packaged applications your serving (like Joomla and Wordpress) they may (repeat may, there is no evidence at this time) have found one. You did say that you patched everything, but was that post-crack? What was your patching routine prior to this problem?

dpkg.log - Did you do any of these installations? If not, we may have a date to start working with.

I'm with Noway2 on this, putting this machine back online is probably not the best idea. If you need to get your clients back online, I'd do it from a clean install.
 
Old 05-06-2011, 04:19 PM   #34
MartinM
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Noway2 View Post
Now that is suspicious. Do you per chance have other segfault errors, especially and / or anything concerning PHP-CGI? I am guessing that this application is either the scanner or was the entry vector using the segfault to give them a root shell (hint - google the terms ssh scan segfault and you will get some interesting results).

I am not certain what to recommend about putting anything back on line. It is a risk. If you absolutely must, I would say do so by opening specific ports in the firewall, but you will need to concretely verify the integrity of the files in question as well as the server process that you would run. I would also caution to make an image of the system first, with the image you can always perform an analysis at your leisure.
Well, I have over 5 MB of these segfault entries, it's in the mail on its' way to Hangdog42
 
Old 05-06-2011, 04:25 PM   #35
MartinM
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Quote:
Originally Posted by OlRoy View Post
find / -name *ssh-scan*

Should find the scanner and thus the attacker's working directory, unless a type of rootkit has been installed.

You might also want to try:

ls -alh /usr/games/go
ls -alh /tmp/

The garbage isn't base64 and doesn't look like any kind of rot based on frequency of characters. Not that I'm a cryptanalyst or anything. I did some googling and apparently it has to do with the terminal. http://docs.intersystems.com/cache20...Y=GVTT_termdef
Code:
mmn001:~# find / -name *ssh-scan*
/usr/games/go/ssh-scan
Code:
mmn001:~# ls -alh /usr/games/go
total 2.5M
drwxr-xr-x 3 root         root 4.0K May  6 19:36 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root         root 4.0K Apr 28 23:55 ..
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  838 Apr 28 23:01 1
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  956 Apr 28 23:07 10
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  782 Apr 28 23:02 2
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  889 Apr 28 23:04 3
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  898 Apr 28 23:03 4
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  836 Apr 28 23:04 5
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  808 Apr 28 23:05 6
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  897 Apr 28 23:05 7
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  846 Apr 28 23:06 8
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  845 Apr 28 23:06 9
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 1.4K Mar 28 01:52 a
drwxr-xr-x 2 sw-cp-server 1000 4.0K Dec 23  2009 backdor
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  22K Dec  2  2004 common
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  265 Nov 25  2004 gen-pass.sh
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root   94 Jul 26  2008 go
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 1001 May  2 12:32 go.sh
-rw-r--r-- 1 root         root 1.1M May  6 06:57 mfu.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 root         root 8.4K May  4 22:40 pass_file
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  21K Jul 21  2004 pscan2
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 6.4K Oct 25  2009 scam
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  197 Aug 23  2005 secure
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 444K Jul 12  2004 ss
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 823K Nov 24  2004 ssh-scan
-rw-r--r-- 1 root         root  20K May  6 17:59 vuln.txt
mmn001:~#
sw-cp-server itself is/could be legit, this has to do with the Plesk update-server, but the "backdor", hmmm....

Code:
mmn001:~# ls -alh /tmp/
total 88K
drwxrwxrwt  5 root   root          12K May  6 19:09 .
drwxr-xr-x 22 root   root         4.0K Jan 31 19:17 ..
drwxrwxrwt  2 root   root         4.0K May  3 13:30 .ICE-unix
drwxrwxrwt  2 root   root         4.0K May  3 13:30 .X11-unix
-rw-------  1 root   root          41K May  6 16:51 autoinstaller3.log
drwx------  2 root   root          16K Jan 31 19:11 lost+found
-rw-------  1 root   root            0 May  6 16:19 psa-installer.lock
-rw-rw----  1 psaadm sw-cp-server  129 May  6 10:53 rkhunter.state
srw-rw-rw-  1 root   root            0 May  3 13:32 spamd_full.sock
mmn001:~#
I think (duh....) that especially the second command (ls -alh /usr/games/go) is giving away some interesting info, to say the least.... (and certainly not limited to the two entries I marked red, the others are just as suspicious.

Last edited by MartinM; 05-06-2011 at 04:32 PM. Reason: Additions
 
Old 05-06-2011, 04:37 PM   #36
OlRoy
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Try these commands to get different time stamps on files. This is also a way to get a possible idea for the time the incident started.

ls -altuh /usr/games/go
ls -alth /usr/games/go
ls -altch /usr/games/go
file /usr/games/go/*

Last edited by OlRoy; 05-06-2011 at 04:42 PM.
 
Old 05-06-2011, 04:47 PM   #37
MartinM
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Hangdog42 View Post
The other bit I'd add to Noway2's observation is that the screen session path is pointing to /usr/games/go (I see OlRoy noticed that one too). That might not be anything, but it strikes me as a bit on the odd side. Might want to have a look in there and see if anything looks suspicious.
Even I already noticed that one, since I am quite sure I have no user who is called games, at least not a paying one

Quote:
Originally Posted by Hangdog42 View Post
Just a couple of comments on your log discoveries:

Apache error log - It's clear someone took/is taking a good hard look at your server for known vulnerabilities. Given the number of pre-packaged applications your serving (like Joomla and Wordpress) they may (repeat may, there is no evidence at this time) have found one. You did say that you patched everything, but was that post-crack? What was your patching routine prior to this problem?
I'm always strict with that, when there are updates for WP or J!, I apply them as soon as I've seen the first reactions from others that their installations haven't been bricked. In reality this would mean that any installation from these CMSses would be up to date within 24 hrs after release.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Hangdog42 View Post
dpkg.log - Did you do any of these installations? If not, we may have a date to start working with.
I honestly wouldn't be able to tell you for sure, which imho means that the answer is probably "no". I just checked my mail to see when I received the first complaints from my hoster, and it turns out that this has been Apr 18 21:12:50, so this could very well be a start-date indeed.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Hangdog42 View Post
I'm with Noway2 on this, putting this machine back online is probably not the best idea. If you need to get your clients back online, I'd do it from a clean install.
I'm sticking to that too, I will go and get some sleep now (midnight in my timezone) and check back again tomorrow.

I want to stress that I am so grateful for all the great help I am receiving here, words are not enough (especially when you're not a native speaker, like me )
 
Old 05-06-2011, 04:50 PM   #38
MartinM
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Quote:
Originally Posted by OlRoy View Post
Try these commands to get different time stamps on files. This is also a way to get a possible idea for the time the incident started.

ls -altuh /usr/games/go
ls -alth /usr/games/go
ls -altch /usr/games/go
file /usr/games/go/*
Code:
mmn001:~# ls -altuh /usr/games/go
total 2.5M
drwxr-xr-x 3 root         root 4.0K May  6 23:47 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root         root 4.0K May  6 23:15 ..
drwxr-xr-x 2 sw-cp-server 1000 4.0K May  6 23:15 backdor
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root   94 May  6 19:36 go
-rw-r--r-- 1 root         root 1.1M May  6 19:36 mfu.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 root         root 8.4K May  6 19:36 pass_file
-rw-r--r-- 1 root         root  20K May  6 10:57 vuln.txt
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 823K May  6 06:57 ssh-scan
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 444K May  6 06:52 ss
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 1001 May  4 22:40 go.sh
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  838 May  4 22:39 1
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  956 May  4 22:39 10
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  782 May  4 22:39 2
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  889 May  4 22:39 3
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  898 May  4 22:39 4
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  836 May  4 22:39 5
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  808 May  4 22:39 6
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  897 May  4 22:39 7
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  846 May  4 22:39 8
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  845 May  4 22:39 9
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 1.4K Apr 29 00:05 a
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  22K Apr 28 23:55 common
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  265 Apr 28 23:55 gen-pass.sh
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  21K Apr 28 23:55 pscan2
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 6.4K Apr 28 23:55 scam
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  197 Apr 28 23:55 secure
mmn001:~# ls -alth /usr/games/go
total 2.5M
drwxr-xr-x 3 root         root 4.0K May  6 19:36 .
-rw-r--r-- 1 root         root  20K May  6 17:59 vuln.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 root         root 1.1M May  6 06:57 mfu.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 root         root 8.4K May  4 22:40 pass_file
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 1001 May  2 12:32 go.sh
drwxr-xr-x 3 root         root 4.0K Apr 28 23:55 ..
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  956 Apr 28 23:07 10
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  845 Apr 28 23:06 9
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  846 Apr 28 23:06 8
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  897 Apr 28 23:05 7
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  808 Apr 28 23:05 6
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  836 Apr 28 23:04 5
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  889 Apr 28 23:04 3
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  898 Apr 28 23:03 4
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  782 Apr 28 23:02 2
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  838 Apr 28 23:01 1
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 1.4K Mar 28 01:52 a
drwxr-xr-x 2 sw-cp-server 1000 4.0K Dec 23  2009 backdor
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 6.4K Oct 25  2009 scam
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root   94 Jul 26  2008 go
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  197 Aug 23  2005 secure
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  22K Dec  2  2004 common
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  265 Nov 25  2004 gen-pass.sh
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 823K Nov 24  2004 ssh-scan
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  21K Jul 21  2004 pscan2
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 444K Jul 12  2004 ss
mmn001:~# ls -altch /usr/games/go
total 2.5M
drwxr-xr-x 3 root         root 4.0K May  6 19:36 .
-rw-r--r-- 1 root         root  20K May  6 17:59 vuln.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 root         root 1.1M May  6 06:57 mfu.txt
drwxr-xr-x 2 sw-cp-server 1000 4.0K May  5 01:32 backdor
-rw-r--r-- 1 root         root 8.4K May  4 22:40 pass_file
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 1001 May  2 12:32 go.sh
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  838 Apr 29 00:09 1
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  956 Apr 29 00:09 10
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  782 Apr 29 00:09 2
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  889 Apr 29 00:09 3
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  898 Apr 29 00:09 4
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  836 Apr 29 00:09 5
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  808 Apr 29 00:09 6
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  897 Apr 29 00:09 7
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  846 Apr 29 00:09 8
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  845 Apr 29 00:09 9
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 1.4K Apr 29 00:09 a
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  22K Apr 29 00:09 common
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  265 Apr 29 00:09 gen-pass.sh
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root   94 Apr 29 00:09 go
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  21K Apr 29 00:09 pscan2
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 6.4K Apr 29 00:09 scam
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root  197 Apr 29 00:09 secure
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 444K Apr 29 00:09 ss
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root         root 823K Apr 29 00:09 ssh-scan
drwxr-xr-x 3 root         root 4.0K Apr 28 23:55 ..
mmn001:~# file /usr/games/go/*
/usr/games/go/1:           ASCII text
/usr/games/go/10:          ASCII text
/usr/games/go/2:           ASCII text
/usr/games/go/3:           ASCII text
/usr/games/go/4:           ASCII text
/usr/games/go/5:           ASCII text
/usr/games/go/6:           ASCII text
/usr/games/go/7:           ASCII text
/usr/games/go/8:           ASCII text
/usr/games/go/9:           ASCII text
/usr/games/go/a:           ISO-8859 text, with CRLF line terminators
/usr/games/go/backdor:     directory
/usr/games/go/common:      ASCII C++ program text
/usr/games/go/gen-pass.sh: Bourne-Again shell script text executable
/usr/games/go/go:          ASCII text
/usr/games/go/go.sh:       ASCII text
/usr/games/go/mfu.txt:     ASCII text
/usr/games/go/pass_file:   ASCII text
/usr/games/go/pscan2:      ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.2.5, not stripped
/usr/games/go/scam:        Bourne-Again shell script text executable
/usr/games/go/secure:      Bourne-Again shell script text executable
/usr/games/go/ss:          ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.0.0, stripped
/usr/games/go/ssh-scan:    ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.0.0, stripped
/usr/games/go/vuln.txt:    ASCII text
mmn001:~#
 
Old 05-06-2011, 04:57 PM   #39
MartinM
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Already mentioned it in my previous post, but I'm gonna get some sleep (My 4 year old daughter will make sure I don't sleep in tomorrow ) and I'll be back tomorrow.

Everyone involved: Thanks, have a good one and talk to you later. I really appreciate your help!
 
Old 05-06-2011, 05:13 PM   #40
OlRoy
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Quote:
Originally Posted by MartinM View Post
Already mentioned it in my previous post, but I'm gonna get some sleep (My 4 year old daughter will make sure I don't sleep in tomorrow ) and I'll be back tomorrow.

Everyone involved: Thanks, have a good one and talk to you later. I really appreciate your help!
@MartinM Good Nite.

@anyone else Is there anything interesting in the logs that were sent to you around those ctimes on the April 28th and after?

I'm curious as to exactly what is in the malicious directory, specifically the "scam" and "secure" shell scripts, and of course the backdoor directory.
 
Old 05-06-2011, 05:28 PM   #41
MartinM
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really going now, but the contents of backdor is:

Code:
bin.tgz  conf.tgz  lib.tgz  setup  setup~
The three .tgz files have a creation date of april/may 2003, the 2 setup files are dated 03-12-10

And now I'm really gone
 
Old 05-06-2011, 05:48 PM   #42
OlRoy
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Quote:
Originally Posted by MartinM View Post
really going now, but the contents of backdor is:

Code:
bin.tgz  conf.tgz  lib.tgz  setup  setup~
The three .tgz files have a creation date of april/may 2003, the 2 setup files are dated 03-12-10

And now I'm really gone
Looks like an old rootkit, and rootkits are one of unspawn's areas. If it was installed, it's not doing a very good job though.

When you get a chance, what are the last accessed times on those files? You should also try greping through your logs for events that happened around April 28th. Perhaps also using the find command to locate files that were changed on the April 28th. Like was mentioned eariler though, these commands could be affected by a rootkit. This attacker appears to be sloppy and with a little luck you may be able to important evidence in the logs. Here is a log cheat sheet for what you should be looking for.

BTW: Your root SSH password is a possible vector. Are you sure it was a strong one?

Last edited by OlRoy; 05-06-2011 at 05:51 PM.
 
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Old 05-06-2011, 06:48 PM   #43
Noway2
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OlRoy, thank you for providing some top notch insight and some fresh eyes!

I think everyone might find this thread interesting. At least this isn't the first time this one has been around the block: http://ubuntuforums.org/showthread.php?t=1260606 It is an interesting thread in that it mentions the same files, with the same segfault violation. In that particular case, the primary suspect was a password crack by brute force, but the subject of an SSH buffer overflow with code injection was also raised.

I do think we have located the question code. Now, to find out how it happened. April 28th looks like a pretty good target date to focus on.

@MartinM, do you have the older logs, eg. auth.log.1 and the .gz archives? There may be some indications of a password attempt in older auth.log.

Also, what version of SSH are you running and how strong was your password? (the password you used should be permanently forfeit now too).

It would also be interesting to get a copy of this code. Please don't destroy it as some of us may wish to examine it.
 
Old 05-06-2011, 07:37 PM   #44
slimm609
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MartinM: would you please tar up the /usr/games/go directory and mail them to hangdog if he does not have a problem with that.


Hangdog: would you please forward the other stuff he sent to the group also. If you don't have a problem receiving the other files also forward those as well. There may be some useful info in there to help track this down and maybe something useful for future detection and maybe some info useful for Rkhunter. If you do not feel comfortable receiving the files just say so and I will get in contact with him to forward and see what is going on.

Last edited by slimm609; 05-06-2011 at 07:38 PM.
 
Old 05-06-2011, 07:54 PM   #45
OlRoy
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@Noway2 No problem, thanks for kicking off the investigation.

I knew there was a segfault with ssh-scan, but not sshd. If that's the case, you're right in that an exploit against SSHd is a good possibility. Another possibility is like you originally mentioned in this thread, SSHd binary could of been altered, and that might account for the segfaults.

It will definitely help in getting things narrowed down if we know the Internet facing services and their versions at around the suspected time of the incident.

I'd also like to see the contents of /usr/games/ and /root/ because this "OLDPWD=/root" makes it seem like he was in that directory for a while. Also the last accessed time of wget, curl, ftp, or anything else that could of been used to download files. I'd prefer The Sleuth Kit to create a timeline, but I guess we've gotten this far without it...

With that said, the logs are our best source of evidence right now for determining the attack vector so I hope that rootkit setup script didn't include code to delete the logs when installing itself.

BTW: I noticed drwxr-xr-x 2 sw-cp-server 1000 4.0K May 6 23:15 backdor

Googled for that username and it's related to Plesk. Anyone have any theories?

Last edited by OlRoy; 05-06-2011 at 08:58 PM.
 
  


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