anyone using AppArmor in a Debian/Mint environment?

I note on the AppArmor net page -- AppArmor should work on Debian

based on my personal experience from System/360, RACF, through Windows UAC and now Linux there are two fundamental rules for security:

1. the o/s must not permit any un-authorized updates to itself.
2. the system owner/operator must be able to regulate what an application program or user is allowed to do.

the later was introduced to system 360 with RACF: 1974 these rules are also operational in Unix/Linux systems.

product liability: the o/s builder is responsible for making sure the tools (1, & 2, above) are effective. the system owner/operator is responsible for applying the rules.

* "you want to do what using that ? *

For example things you would want to be able to do using your file manager could be very different from what you want to do using your browser... especially since you know the program that the browser is running ( called a web page ) -- probably does not have your interests in mind ...

thus what you would want to be able to do using yiour file manager would be very different from what you would allow someone (the web author) to do to you using your browser...

e.g. read your /Correspondence directory

I've been using apparmor (and subdomain) on suse since 2001. Never tried debian or mint but since apparmor comes with ubuntu I expect it can be done without much difficulty.

There are, of course, limits to what systems like AppArmor can realistically do. They generally try to profile what an application should and should not be allowed to do "in Everyman's hands," knowing that there inevitably will be a small additional number of Gods (who also are a personally identifiable set of individuals/accounts). The goal is simply "like fraud-prevention" ... looking for attempts whch appear to land outside of the established status-quo and preventing them from automatically going through.

When you are "training" such systems, generally you should do two things:

1. Be sure that each thing which the AppArmor tool is "watching" will settle-upon a single, well-established profile. For example, if a particular tool is available both to the general public and to internal users, perhaps it will be necessary for each instance (although "they are, in fact, identical") to be perceived by the training-system as being unique, so that profiles appropriate to each user-base will be gathered.
2. Avoid letting "godly" behavior be seen by the training system while it is training. Keep your 'Golden Ticket' in your pocket.