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Nickj 10-11-2005 10:27 AM

Required IPTables restart after each boot for NATing??
 
Hi all,

I have a similar problem to the one I found here

Basically, although the firewall script in /etc/init.d/ is fine, NAT doesn't work until I restart the iptables script.

Having read the similar post, I belive it's because my firewall box has an Internet IP and IPtables is starting at a too early stage.

Although the answer is given on the other post, it doesn't give much explanation as to how to check and change these startup orders.

Can anyone point me in the right direction here?

Cheers guys,

Nick

Brian1 10-11-2005 09:30 PM

Startup order is defined in each runlevel. Most Linux install in runlevel 3 means networking enabled and runlevel 5 is Start X with networking. So if you look in /etc/rc0.d - /etc/rc.d. Since you are using FC4 and more than likely you are login in a gui login manager like gdm or kdm, then look in rc5.d. In there are scripts They start with either a K for kill or S for start. So in that runlevel all the S ones will startup and if any of the K ones are running from other runlevels they are killed. Now for the number for the S the smaller the number the sooner it starts. So S20 starts before S45 up to S99.

To understand this you can goto your ALT-Ctrl-F1 terminal and login as root. Run the command ' init 3 ' and X will shutdown and you will be in runlevel 3. Then type ' init 5 'to get X backup and goto your Alt-Ctrl-F7 to get to F1's gui mate. You can google around at http://www.google.com/linux and read many pages about runlevels and what each one is for.

I am not sure how you setup the iptables script but more than likely the ip forwarding modules is not loading quickly enough before defining other parts. What I would do is Get the default iptables section up and then add the masquerading part to the /etc/rc.local. You can eiteher put those lines in a script and then have rc.local start the script or have the commands in the rc.local file.

Could you post your iptables script? Have you included modprobe statements to start the needed modules.

Hope this helps.
Brian1

Nickj 10-12-2005 03:54 AM

Cheers for the response Brian.

Bit of a newb to all this so my firewall script was generated here

It basically looks as follows...

Code:

#!/bin/sh
##
#
# Local Settings
#

# sysctl location.  If set, it will use sysctl to adjust the kernel parameters.
# If this is set to the empty string (or is unset), the use of sysctl
# is disabled.

SYSCTL="/sbin/sysctl -w"

# To echo the value directly to the /proc file instead
# SYSCTL=""

# IPTables Location - adjust if needed

IPT="/sbin/iptables"
IPTS="/sbin/iptables-save"
IPTR="/sbin/iptables-restore"

# Internet Interface
INET_IFACE="eth0"

# Local Interface Information
LOCAL_IFACE="eth1"
LOCAL_IP="192.168.1.1"
LOCAL_NET="192.168.1.0/24"
LOCAL_BCAST="192.168.1.255"

# Localhost Interface

LO_IFACE="lo"
LO_IP="127.0.0.1"

# Save and Restore arguments handled here
if [ "$1" = "save" ]
then
echo -n "Saving firewall to /etc/sysconfig/iptables ... "
$IPTS > /etc/sysconfig/iptables
echo "done"
exit 0
elif [ "$1" = "restore" ]
then
echo -n "Restoring firewall from /etc/sysconfig/iptables ... "
$IPTR < /etc/sysconfig/iptables
echo "done"
exit 0
fi

###
#
# Load Modules
#

echo "Loading kernel modules ..."

# You should uncomment the line below and run it the first time just to
# ensure all kernel module dependencies are OK.  There is no need to run
# every time, however.

# /sbin/depmod -a

# Unless you have kernel module auto-loading disabled, you should not
# need to manually load each of these modules.  Other than ip_tables,
# ip_conntrack, and some of the optional modules, I've left these
# commented by default.  Uncomment if you have any problems or if
# you have disabled module autoload.  Note that some modules must
# be loaded by another kernel module.

# core netfilter module
/sbin/modprobe ip_tables

# the stateful connection tracking module
/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack

# filter table module
# /sbin/modprobe iptable_filter

# mangle table module
# /sbin/modprobe iptable_mangle

# nat table module
# /sbin/modprobe iptable_nat

# LOG target module
# /sbin/modprobe ipt_LOG

# This is used to limit the number of packets per sec/min/hr
# /sbin/modprobe ipt_limit

# masquerade target module
# /sbin/modprobe ipt_MASQUERADE

# filter using owner as part of the match
# /sbin/modprobe ipt_owner

# REJECT target drops the packet and returns an ICMP response.
# The response is configurable.  By default, connection refused.
# /sbin/modprobe ipt_REJECT

# This target allows packets to be marked in the mangle table
# /sbin/modprobe ipt_mark

# This target affects the TCP MSS
# /sbin/modprobe ipt_tcpmss

# This match allows multiple ports instead of a single port or range
# /sbin/modprobe multiport

# This match checks against the TCP flags
# /sbin/modprobe ipt_state

# This match catches packets with invalid flags
# /sbin/modprobe ipt_unclean

# The ftp nat module is required for non-PASV ftp support
/sbin/modprobe ip_nat_ftp

# the module for full ftp connection tracking
/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack_ftp

# the module for full irc connection tracking
/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack_irc


#######
#
# Kernel Parameter Configuration
#
# See http://ipsysctl-tutorial.frozentux.n...tml/index.html
# for a detailed tutorial on sysctl and the various settings
# available.

# Required to enable IPv4 forwarding.
# Redhat users can try setting FORWARD_IPV4 in /etc/sysconfig/network to true
# Alternatively, it can be set in /etc/sysctl.conf
if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
then
    echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
else
    $SYSCTL net.ipv4.ip_forward="1"
fi

# This enables dynamic address hacking.
# This may help if you have a dynamic IP address \(e.g. slip, ppp, dhcp\).
#if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
#then
#    echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr
#else
#    $SYSCTL net.ipv4.ip_dynaddr="1"
#fi

# This enables SYN flood protection.
# The SYN cookies activation allows your system to accept an unlimited
# number of TCP connections while still trying to give reasonable
# service during a denial of service attack.
if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
then
    echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies
else
    $SYSCTL net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies="1"
fi

# This enables source validation by reversed path according to RFC1812.
# In other words, did the response packet originate from the same interface
# through which the source packet was sent?  It's recommended for single-homed
# systems and routers on stub networks.  Since those are the configurations
# this firewall is designed to support, I turn it on by default.
# Turn it off if you use multiple NICs connected to the same network.
if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
then
    echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter
else
    $SYSCTL net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter="1"
fi

# This option allows a subnet to be firewalled with a single IP address.
# It's used to build a DMZ.  Since that's not a focus of this firewall
# script, it's not enabled by default, but is included for reference.
# See: http://www.sjdjweis.com/linux/proxyarp/
#if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
#then
#    echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/proxy_arp
#else
#    $SYSCTL net.ipv4.conf.all.proxy_arp="1"
#fi

# The following kernel settings were suggested by Alex Weeks. Thanks!

# This kernel parameter instructs the kernel to ignore all ICMP
# echo requests sent to the broadcast address.  This prevents
# a number of smurfs and similar DoS nasty attacks.
if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
then
    echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts
else
    $SYSCTL net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts="1"
fi

# This option can be used to accept or refuse source routed
# packets.  It is usually on by default, but is generally
# considered a security risk.  This option turns it off.
if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
then
    echo "0" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/accept_source_route
else
    $SYSCTL net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route="0"
fi

# This option can disable ICMP redirects.  ICMP redirects
# are generally considered a security risk and shouldn't be
# needed by most systems using this generator.
#if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
#then
#    echo "0" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/accept_redirects
#else
#    $SYSCTL net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects="0"
#fi

# However, we'll ensure the secure_redirects option is on instead.
# This option accepts only from gateways in the default gateways list.
if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
then
    echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/secure_redirects
else
    $SYSCTL net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects="1"
fi

# This option logs packets from impossible addresses.
if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ]
then
    echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/log_martians
else
    $SYSCTL net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians="1"
fi


###############################################################################
#
# Flush Any Existing Rules or Chains
#

echo "Flushing Tables ..."

# Reset Default Policies
$IPT -P INPUT ACCEPT
$IPT -P FORWARD ACCEPT
$IPT -P OUTPUT ACCEPT
$IPT -t nat -P PREROUTING ACCEPT
$IPT -t nat -P POSTROUTING ACCEPT
$IPT -t nat -P OUTPUT ACCEPT
$IPT -t mangle -P PREROUTING ACCEPT
$IPT -t mangle -P OUTPUT ACCEPT

# Flush all rules
$IPT -F
$IPT -t nat -F
$IPT -t mangle -F

# Erase all non-default chains
$IPT -X
$IPT -t nat -X
$IPT -t mangle -X

if [ "$1" = "stop" ]
then
echo "Firewall completely flushed!  Now running with no firewall."
exit 0
fi

############
#
# Rules Configuration
#

############
#
# Filter Table
#
#############

# Set Policies

$IPT -P INPUT DROP
$IPT -P OUTPUT DROP
$IPT -P FORWARD DROP

############
#
# User-Specified Chains
#
# Create user chains to reduce the number of rules each packet
# must traverse.

echo "Create and populate custom rule chains ..."

# Create a chain to filter INVALID packets

$IPT -N bad_packets

# Create another chain to filter bad tcp packets

$IPT -N bad_tcp_packets

# Create separate chains for icmp, tcp (incoming and outgoing),
# and incoming udp packets.

$IPT -N icmp_packets

# Used for UDP packets inbound from the Internet
$IPT -N udp_inbound

# Used to block outbound UDP services from internal network
# Default to allow all
$IPT -N udp_outbound

# Used to allow inbound services if desired
# Default fail except for established sessions
$IPT -N tcp_inbound

# Used to block outbound services from internal network
# Default to allow all
$IPT -N tcp_outbound

###########
#
# Populate User Chains
#

# bad_packets chain
#

# Drop packets received on the external interface
# claiming a source of the local network
$IPT -A bad_packets -p ALL -i $INET_IFACE -s $LOCAL_NET -j LOG \
    --log-prefix "fp=bad_packets:2 a=DROP "
$IPT -A bad_packets -p ALL -i $INET_IFACE -s $LOCAL_NET -j DROP

# Drop INVALID packets immediately
$IPT -A bad_packets -p ALL -m state --state INVALID -j LOG \
    --log-prefix "fp=bad_packets:1 a=DROP "

$IPT -A bad_packets -p ALL -m state --state INVALID -j DROP

# Then check the tcp packets for additional problems
$IPT -A bad_packets -p tcp -j bad_tcp_packets

# All good, so return
$IPT -A bad_packets -p ALL -j RETURN

# bad_tcp_packets chain
#
# All tcp packets will traverse this chain.
# Every new connection attempt should begin with
# a syn packet.  If it doesn't, it is likely a
# port scan.  This drops packets in state
# NEW that are not flagged as syn packets.

# Return to the calling chain if the bad packets originate
# from the local interface. This maintains the approach
# throughout this firewall of a largely trusted internal
# network.
$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp -i $LOCAL_IFACE -j RETURN

# However, I originally did apply this filter to the forward chain
# for packets originating from the internal network.  While I have
# not conclusively determined its effect, it appears to have the
# interesting side effect of blocking some of the ad systems.
# Apparently some ad systems have the browser initiate a NEW
# connection that is not flagged as a syn packet to retrieve
# the ad image.  If you wish to experiment further comment the
# rule above. If you try it, you may also wish to uncomment the
# rule below.  It will keep those packets from being logged.
# There are a lot of them.
# $IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp -i $LOCAL_IFACE ! --syn -m state \
#    --state NEW -j DROP

$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp ! --syn -m state --state NEW -j LOG \
    --log-prefix "fp=bad_tcp_packets:1 a=DROP "
$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp ! --syn -m state --state NEW -j DROP

$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL NONE -j LOG \
    --log-prefix "fp=bad_tcp_packets:2 a=DROP "
$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL NONE -j DROP

$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL ALL -j LOG \
    --log-prefix "fp=bad_tcp_packets:3 a=DROP "
$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL ALL -j DROP

$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL FIN,URG,PSH -j LOG \
    --log-prefix "fp=bad_tcp_packets:4 a=DROP "
$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL FIN,URG,PSH -j DROP

$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL SYN,RST,ACK,FIN,URG -j LOG \
    --log-prefix "fp=bad_tcp_packets:5 a=DROP "
$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL SYN,RST,ACK,FIN,URG -j DROP

$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN,RST -j LOG \
    --log-prefix "fp=bad_tcp_packets:6 a=DROP "
$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN,RST -j DROP

$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,FIN SYN,FIN -j LOG \
    --log-prefix "fp=bad_tcp_packets:7 a=DROP "
$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,FIN SYN,FIN -j DROP

# All good, so return
$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp -j RETURN

# icmp_packets chain
#
# This chain is for inbound (from the Internet) icmp packets only.
# Type 8 (Echo Request) is not accepted by default
# Enable it if you want remote hosts to be able to reach you.
# 11 (Time Exceeded) is the only one accepted
# that would not already be covered by the established
# connection rule.  Applied to INPUT on the external interface.
#
# See: http://www.ee.siue.edu/~rwalden/networking/icmp.html
# for more info on ICMP types.
#
# Note that the stateful settings allow replies to ICMP packets.
# These rules allow new packets of the specified types.

# ICMP packets should fit in a Layer 2 frame, thus they should
# never be fragmented.  Fragmented ICMP packets are a typical sign
# of a denial of service attack.
$IPT -A icmp_packets --fragment -p ICMP -j LOG \
    --log-prefix "fp=icmp_packets:1 a=DROP "
$IPT -A icmp_packets --fragment -p ICMP -j DROP

# Echo - uncomment to allow your system to be pinged.
# Uncomment the LOG command if you also want to log PING attempts
#
# $IPT -A icmp_packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 --icmp-type 8 -j LOG \
#    --log-prefix "fp=icmp_packets:2 a=ACCEPT "
# $IPT -A icmp_packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 --icmp-type 8 -j ACCEPT

# By default, however, drop pings without logging. Blaster
# and other worms have infected systems blasting pings.
# Comment the line below if you want pings logged, but it
# will likely fill your logs.
$IPT -A icmp_packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 --icmp-type 8 -j DROP

# Time Exceeded
$IPT -A icmp_packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 --icmp-type 11 -j ACCEPT

# Not matched, so return so it will be logged
$IPT -A icmp_packets -p ICMP -j RETURN

# TCP & UDP
# Identify ports at:
#    http://www.chebucto.ns.ca/~rakerman/port-table.html
#    http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers

# udp_inbound chain
#
# This chain describes the inbound UDP packets it will accept.
# It's applied to INPUT on the external or Internet interface.
# Note that the stateful settings allow replies.
# These rules are for new requests.
# It drops netbios packets (windows) immediately without logging.

# Drop netbios calls
# Please note that these rules do not really change the way the firewall
# treats netbios connections.  Connections from the localhost and
# internal interface (if one exists) are accepted by default.
# Responses from the Internet to requests initiated by or through
# the firewall are also accepted by default.  To get here, the
# packets would have to be part of a new request received by the
# Internet interface.  You would have to manually add rules to
# accept these.  I added these rules because some network connections,
# such as those via cable modems, tend to be filled with noise from
# unprotected Windows machines.  These rules drop those packets
# quickly and without logging them.  This prevents them from traversing
# the whole chain and keeps the log from getting cluttered with
# chatter from Windows systems.
$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --destination-port 137 -j DROP
$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --destination-port 138 -j DROP

# Dynamic Address
# If DHCP, the initial request is a broadcast. The response
# doesn't exactly match the outbound packet.  This explicitly
# allow the DHCP ports to alleviate this problem.
# If you receive your dynamic address by a different means, you
# can probably comment this line.
$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --source-port 67 --destination-port 68 \
    -j ACCEPT

# User specified allowed UDP protocol
$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --destination-port 6881:6882 -j ACCEPT


# Not matched, so return for logging
$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -j RETURN

# udp_outbound chain
#
# This chain is used with a private network to prevent forwarding for
# UDP requests on specific protocols.  Applied to the FORWARD rule from
# the internal network.  Ends with an ACCEPT


# No match, so ACCEPT
$IPT -A udp_outbound -p UDP -s 0/0 -j ACCEPT

# tcp_inbound chain
#
# This chain is used to allow inbound connections to the
# system/gateway.  Use with care.  It defaults to none.
# It's applied on INPUT from the external or Internet interface.

# FTP Server (Control)
$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 21 -j ACCEPT

# FTP Client (Data Port for non-PASV transfers)
$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --source-port 20 -j ACCEPT

# Passive FTP
#
# With passive FTP, the server provides a port to the client
# and allows the client to initiate the connection rather
# than initiating the connection with the client from the data port.
# Web browsers and clients operating behind a firewall generally
# use passive ftp transfers.  A general purpose FTP server
# will need to support them.
#
# However, by default an FTP server will select a port from the entire
# range of high ports.  It is not particularly safe to open all
# high ports.  Fortunately, that range can be restricted.  This
# firewall presumes that the range has been restricted to a specific
# selected range.  That range must also be configured in the ftp server.
#
# Instructions for specifying the port range for the wu-ftpd server
# can be found here:
# http://www.wu-ftpd.org/man/ftpaccess.html
# (See the passive ports option.)
#
# Instructions for the ProFTPD server can be found here:
# http://proftpd.linux.co.uk/localsite...nked/x861.html

$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 62000:64000 -j ACCEPT

# sshd
$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 22 -j ACCEPT

# User specified allowed UDP protocol
$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 6881:6882 -j ACCEPT


# Not matched, so return so it will be logged
$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -j RETURN

# tcp_outbound chain
#
# This chain is used with a private network to prevent forwarding for
# requests on specific protocols.  Applied to the FORWARD rule from
# the internal network.  Ends with an ACCEPT

# Block Outbound Telnet
$IPT -A tcp_outbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 23 -j REJECT


# No match, so ACCEPT
$IPT -A tcp_outbound -p TCP -s 0/0 -j ACCEPT

#########
# INPUT Chain
#

echo "Process INPUT chain ..."

# Allow all on localhost interface
$IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -i $LO_IFACE -j ACCEPT

# Drop bad packets
$IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -j bad_packets

# DOCSIS compliant cable modems
# Some DOCSIS compliant cable modems send IGMP multicasts to find
# connected PCs.  The multicast packets have the destination address
# 224.0.0.1.  You can accept them.  If you choose to do so,
# Uncomment the rule to ACCEPT them and comment the rule to DROP
# them  The firewall will drop them here by default to avoid
# cluttering the log.  The firewall will drop all multicasts
# to the entire subnet (224.0.0.1) by default.  To only affect
# IGMP multicasts, change '-p ALL' to '-p 2'.  Of course,
# if they aren't accepted elsewhere, it will only ensure that
# multicasts on other protocols are logged.
# Drop them without logging.
$IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -d 224.0.0.1 -j DROP
# The rule to accept the packets.
# $IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -d 224.0.0.1 -j ACCEPT

# Rules for the private network (accessing gateway system itself)
$IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -i $LOCAL_IFACE -s $LOCAL_NET -j ACCEPT
$IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -i $LOCAL_IFACE -d $LOCAL_BCAST -j ACCEPT


# Inbound Internet Packet Rules

# Accept Established Connections
$IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -i $INET_IFACE -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \
    -j ACCEPT

# Route the rest to the appropriate user chain
$IPT -A INPUT -p TCP -i $INET_IFACE -j tcp_inbound
$IPT -A INPUT -p UDP -i $INET_IFACE -j udp_inbound
$IPT -A INPUT -p ICMP -i $INET_IFACE -j icmp_packets

# Drop without logging broadcasts that get this far.
# Cuts down on log clutter.
# Comment this line if testing new rules that impact
# broadcast protocols.
$IPT -A INPUT -m pkttype --pkt-type broadcast -j DROP

# Log packets that still don't match
$IPT -A INPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "fp=INPUT:99 a=DROP "

##############
#
# FORWARD Chain
#

echo "Process FORWARD chain ..."

# Used if forwarding for a private network

# Drop bad packets
$IPT -A FORWARD -p ALL -j bad_packets

# Accept TCP packets we want to forward from internal sources
$IPT -A FORWARD -p tcp -i $LOCAL_IFACE -j tcp_outbound

# Accept UDP packets we want to forward from internal sources
$IPT -A FORWARD -p udp -i $LOCAL_IFACE -j udp_outbound

# If not blocked, accept any other packets from the internal interface
$IPT -A FORWARD -p ALL -i $LOCAL_IFACE -j ACCEPT

# Deal with responses from the internet
$IPT -A FORWARD -i $INET_IFACE -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \
    -j ACCEPT

# Port Forwarding is enabled, so accept forwarded traffic
$IPT -A FORWARD -p udp -i $INET_IFACE --destination-port 7881:7889 \
    --destination 192.168.1.8 -j ACCEPT

$IPT -A FORWARD -p tcp -i $INET_IFACE --destination-port 7881:7889 \
    --destination 192.168.1.8 -j ACCEPT

# Log packets that still don't match
$IPT -A FORWARD -j LOG --log-prefix "fp=FORWARD:99 a=DROP "

#############
#
# OUTPUT Chain
#

echo "Process OUTPUT chain ..."

# Generally trust the firewall on output

# However, invalid icmp packets need to be dropped
# to prevent a possible exploit.
$IPT -A OUTPUT -m state -p icmp --state INVALID -j DROP

# Localhost
$IPT -A OUTPUT -p ALL -s $LO_IP -j ACCEPT
$IPT -A OUTPUT -p ALL -o $LO_IFACE -j ACCEPT

# To internal network
$IPT -A OUTPUT -p ALL -s $LOCAL_IP -j ACCEPT
$IPT -A OUTPUT -p ALL -o $LOCAL_IFACE -j ACCEPT

# To internet
$IPT -A OUTPUT -p ALL -o $INET_IFACE -j ACCEPT

# Log packets that still don't match
$IPT -A OUTPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "fp=OUTPUT:99 a=DROP "

###############
# nat table
#
###############

# The nat table is where network address translation occurs if there
# is a private network.  If the gateway is connected to the Internet
# with a static IP, snat is used.  If the gateway has a dynamic address,
# masquerade must be used instead.  There is more overhead associated
# with masquerade, so snat is better when it can be used.
# The nat table has a builtin chain, PREROUTING, for dnat and redirects.
# Another, POSTROUTING, handles snat and masquerade.

echo "Load rules for nat table ..."

################
#
# PREROUTING chain
#

# Port Forwarding
#
# Port forwarding forwards all traffic on a port or ports from
# the firewall to a computer on the internal LAN.  This can
# be required to support special situations.  For instance,
# this is the only way to support file transfers with an ICQ
# client on an internal computer.  It's also required if an internal
# system hosts a service such as a web server.  However, it's also
# a dangerous option.  It allows Internet computers access to
# your internal network.  Use it carefully and only if you're
# certain you know what you're doing.

$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -p udp -i $INET_IFACE --destination-port 7881:7889 \
    -j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.1.8

$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp -i $INET_IFACE --destination-port 7881:7889 \
    -j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.1.8


#############
#
# POSTROUTING chain
#

$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o $INET_IFACE -j MASQUERADE

#############
#
# mangle table
#
###########

# The mangle table is used to alter packets.  It can alter or mangle them in
# several ways.  For the purposes of this generator, we only use its ability
# to alter the TTL in packets.  However, it can be used to set netfilter
# mark values on specific packets.  Those marks could then be used in another
# table like filter, to limit activities associated with a specific host, for
# instance.  The TOS target can be used to set the Type of Service field in
# the IP header.  Note that the TTL target might not be included in the
# distribution on your system.  If it is not and you require it, you will
# have to add it.  That may require that you build from source.

echo "Load rules for mangle table ..."


Brian1 10-12-2005 06:18 PM

I see you are not using the way FC4 setups Iptables. Your way is the way I write Iptables. I have used that link to get a quick basic start and fine tune it from there. I like how they incorpate many differnet extras to save time modifying base on a per clients needs. Iptables can be a real pain to understand.

I would do it one of two ways.
1. Run the command as to stop iptables from being in the startup process. The command ' chkconfig --level 345 iptables off '. Now edit your /etc/rc.local and add the line ' /etc/sysconfig/iptables '.

or

2. Goto /etc/rc3.d and rename iptables from whatever it is to ' S99iptables '. Do the same in /etc/rc4.d and /etc/rc5.d.

Hope this helps out.
Brian1

Nickj 10-13-2005 03:16 AM

Thanks a lot Brian. I'll give that a go as soon as I get the chance and i'll let you know how i've got on.

Many thanks...


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