First of all, RSA encryption does NOT equal RSA the company. We're talking about the company here.
Second, the reuters article mentions only the Elliptic curve PRNG NOT the Elliptic curve encryption. Basically, the backdoor that was inserted was really just making RSA co. use the Elliptic curve PRNG, which is known to be extremely weak:
It was actually discovered in 2012:
As for Extended Random, see:
We also discovered evidence of the implementation in the RSA BSAFE products of a non-standard TLS extension called “Extended Random.” This extension, co-written at the request of the National Security Agency, allows a client to request longer TLS random nonces from the server, a feature that, if it enabled, would speed up the Dual EC attack by a factor of up to 65,000. In addition, the use of this extension allows for for attacks on Dual EC instances configured with P-384 and P-521 elliptic curves, something that is not apparently possible in standard TLS. While the code implementing Extended Random was not compiled into our build of Share for C/C++, it was available (though deactivated) in the build of Share for Java that we analyzed. In the latter case, we were able to re-enable it and verify the functionality. Note that the attack times reported below do not take advantage of extended random.