How to block this....
Hi guys...
Everyday I always get this in my log. The iptables seems to work fine but how do I get rid of this? Code:
[root@eapi log]# grep eth0 messages Thanks in advance. |
What UDP-based application do you have running that are communicating with performance-4.chi.pnap.net.and 72-19-129-117.network.mesanetworks.net.
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Btw...thanks Mr. C for this & the termcap thingy. I still have not done that yet. I temporarily used the VT220. |
My guess is that there is a site monitoring your network for reachability.
This occurs when, for exmaple, you are running a P2P app, or other service. This isn't uncommon, and the connection is blocked anyway. You could create a specific rule to drop the packet without logging, but this is what logs are for. |
yes it's a traceroute (ttl increase)coming from a linux (using udp).
You get this everyday? Do you host a server on this machine? |
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I did note the non-routable RFC 1918 address, and thought traceroute, but let it drift by. I'm afraid I was on my way towards sleep when I review the thread. |
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Code:
Jul 24 05:23:13 eapi kernel: Inbound IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:13:d3:66:da:62:00:30:48:8a:3d:61:08:00 SRC=69.25.172.24 DST=10.66.0.1 LEN=32 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=1 ID=782 PROTO=UDP SPT=10991 DPT=33438 LEN=12 |
Throw their address in your /etc/hosts.deny file and forget about it. Unless you need them for something.
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Well...I will just ignore this for the time being as suggested by Mr. C.. Its just funny that it was started last 2 weeks ago.
Seems it is only a few hits once a day and as long as the box can handle it (running 24/7). Probably a zombie machine tracerouting every domain name from his/her favorite or bookmark. Thanks guys. |
Hmmm...its a coincidence that this is a part of DNS poisoning? Come to think of it. It started 2 weeks thats just about the same day within 07/10/08.
Excerpt from https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2008-0533.html The DNS protocol protects against spoofing attacks by requiring an attacker to predict both the DNS transaction ID and UDP source port of a request. In recent years, a number of papers have found problems with DNS implementations which make it easier for an attacker to perform DNS cache-poisoning attacks. Previous versions of BIND did not use randomized UDP source ports. If an attacker was able to predict the random DNS transaction ID, this could make DNS cache-poisoning attacks easier. In order to provide more resilience, BIND has been updated to use a range of random UDP source ports. (CVE-2008-1447) Is it? |
Why do you this has anything to do with DNS cache poisoning? It appears to be a simple traceroute.
Anyone can start one, and some applications you use can cause other servers to attempt to measure your distance and latency. I traceroute a number of sites constantly, to maintain a graph of network health. Look at the source address: 69.25.172.16. That the IP maps to performance-4.phx003.pnap.net makes a pretty strong case there is nothing malicious here. If they bother you, create an iptables rule that blocks/drops the packet w/out logging it. |
Hi..Mr C.
Because I tried the test...and sad to say... Code:
This tool checks for DNS cache poisoning susceptibility, a serious security flaw in DNS recently acknowledged by CERT (US Computer Emergency Readiness Team). US-CERT VU#800113 |
You've shown you have the DNS vulnerability, but haven't demonstrated a connection between the two.
Regardless, get the DNS problem fixed. |
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How do I know (or trace) if the IP is hostile or not? Example below... Code:
Jul 28 09:26:04 eapi kernel: Inbound IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:13:d3:66:da:62:00:30:48:8a:3d:61:08:00 SRC=122.52.99.10 DST=10.66.0.1 LEN=56 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=52 ID=49464 PROTO=ICMP TYPE=3 CODE=3 [SRC=10.66.0.1 DST=122.52.99.10 LEN=1484 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=52 ID=46334 DF PROTO=TCP INCOMPLETE [8 bytes] ] |
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